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1. Background and Research Framework 
 
In the knowledge-based economy, knowledge is essential; thus the role of university as 
a source of new knowledge has even become more important than in the past (Etzkowitz et 
al., 2000). Fast-paced global competition, following shifts in technological regime, e.g. 
shorter product life-cycle, adds significance to the firm’s links to university from recovery 
to commercialization of knowledge (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; 
Hwang et al., 2003). In particular, the role of university in a national economy is discussed as 
a key issue in technological innovation, which is centered on the Triple-Helix thesis: this 
thesis emphasizes the shift of university’ role from being an “academic community” to an 
“entrepreneurial academy” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) 
Knowledge commercialization in advanced countries has evolved since the 1980s, 
benefited from the early formed industry-university linkages of the 19th century (Branscomb 
et al., 1999). The U.S. and UK have established university-centered systems, for example, 
the Route 128 or Silicon Valley and the Cambridge Science Park or University of 
Manchester Institute of Science Park. Germany has developed the GRI (government research 
institute)-centered system like the Max-Planck Gesellscharft. 
However, the situation is different for developing countries. In Korea, as a catch-up 
country, technological innovation has been led mainly by chaebols since the early stage of 
industrialization. It resulted in the national innovation system (NIS) of Korea as being 
characterized by “strong large firms and weak small firms” (Lim, 2006). As of 2005, 39.7% 
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of researchers and 52.2% of Ph.D. researchers belong to the top 20 firms (MOST, 2007). 
This imbalance eventually made SMEs face trouble in developing or acquiring new 
technology that is essential for innovation. This chaebol-led innovation also has left 
university lagged behind in terms of growth opportunities in research.3 As of 2005, 69.9% 
of Ph.D. researchers and over 10% of national R&D expenditures belong to university, but 
its role is weak in knowledge commercialization. 
In the NIS, it is essential knowledge to be created, shared, and utilized in a balanced 
manner, benefiting all but not just a few institutional actors. In Korea, where R&D 
resources are concentrated on large-scale firms, it is particularly necessary to make the 
most use of public knowledge assets that belong to university or GRI. Namely, it is crucial 
to establish the NIS where industry-university linkages are firmly established to work as a 
channel to knowledge transfer, particularly for SMEs or venture firms, eventually 
contributing to the enhancement of a nation’s competitiveness. 
In this context, this paper aims to examine the current situation of industry-university or 
GRI linkages in Korea. Considered the important role of GRI in national R&D,4 it also 
includes this into analysis. As a governance form for empirical analysis, this chooses the 
‘technological cooperation’ between industry and university or GRI (IUG cooperation): joint 
or contract R&D is currently the most prevalent form in Korea (KRF, 2007), although it is 
now moving towards diverse forms of knowledge commercialization. This paper seeks to 
answer two main questions: (1) why a firm cooperates with university or GRI and (2) 
whether IUG cooperation contributes to the innovation probability of firms and to what 
type of performance, it has a contribution. 
This paper tests the following four hypotheses. First, IUG cooperation in Korea may be 
determined by firm characteristics, sector characteristics, and government’s support 
measures for R&D. The internal resource of a firm or its substitutability to external 
resource and the effective legal regime for IPR protection matters to the firm’s decision in 
IUG cooperation. Due to the government-led NIS of Korea, the government’s policy for 
R&D is also deterministic to this cooperation. Second, IUG cooperation may not directly 
increases the innovation probability of Korean firms. Unlike the technology from a private 
firm that is tangible with the precise impact of its use, a large part of the knowledge from 
university is intangible with its imprecise impact. Due to these characteristics, IUG 
cooperation is not deterministic to the firms’ success in technological innovation. Third, for 
Korean innovative firms, the impact of IUG cooperation may be revealed in patent rather 
than other types of performance. University’s research and development is characterized as 
being new or creative, but knowledge commercialization system has not well developed in 
Korea, unlike advanced countries. This makes it difficult the knowledge from this 
cooperation to be shifted commercially, eventually revealing the impact only in patent, the 
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prior stage of knowledge commercialization. Fourth, IUG cooperation may contribute to 
product rather than process innovation. It results from the innate characteristics of 
university research that is basic or long-term based, not just practical or short-term based. 
Korean university or GRI has focused on reverse engineering or problem-solving, but their 
research capacity has been improved to be useful or appropriate for product innovation. 
The empirical analysis is based on the 2002 Korean Innovation Survey (KIS) that has 
been conducted by Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI). The KIS comprises of 
firm-level data on technological innovation in the manufacturing sector. In order to allow 
for data credibility, the Survey data is merged with the financial statements of the KIS 
VALUE database compiled by a credit rating agency. This paper, initially, estimates the 
determinants of IUG cooperation using the Probit model. Then, it estimates the impact of 
this cooperation on firm performance. First, this analyzes its impact on the innovation 
probability of firms using the Probit model, where a possible endogeneity of IUG 
cooperation measure is controlled. Second, for innovative firms, this analyzes its impact by 
the type of performance (patent vs. sale) and by the type of innovation (product vs. process 
innovation). Here, a sample selection bias is controlled using Heckman’s 2SLS. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, a brief overview is presented on 
the data. Section II reviews the literature on the NIS and examines the evolution of the NIS 
and IUG linkages in Korea. Section III reviews the existing literature on the determinants 
of IUG cooperation and on its impacts on firm performance, extracting four hypotheses. 
Section IV explains the methodology to be used for empirical analysis. Section V reports to 





The 2002 KIS is the third survey in Korea. The KIS, following the definitions in the 
Oslo Manual5 from the OECD, covers the innovation activities of firms for 2000-2001. Out 
of the 6,233 surveyed firms, 60.6% or 3,776 responded. After matching with the KIS 
VALUE, a total of 538 firms are used for analysis. 
Technological innovation here includes three types – product innovation (new product 
innovation and product-improving innovation) and process innovation. Only innovative firms 
are asked how many patents they file from each type of innovation, and what percentage in 
the sales of innovation outcomes they make from new product innovation and product-
improving innovation. The ‘innovative firms’ are defined as those firms that conduct 
innovation during 2000-2001 and produce at least one innovative outcome, patent or sale, 
in 2001. 
The structure of firms in this survey is as follows (<Figure 1-1>). Out of the total 538 
                                            
5 This is a standardized manual that provides the criteria on innovation surveys. The Manual was firstly 
published by OECD countries in 1992, based on which several Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
projects were conducted. In Korea, three Surveys have been done for last 10 years. 




firms, 388 (72.1%) are innovative firms, while 150 (27.9%) are non-innovative firms. The 
innovative firms are divided into two, namely, 366 (68.0%) firms that do product innovation 
(269 new product innovators and 324 product-improving innovators) and 250 (46.5%) firms that 









The KIS asks firms the question, “Does your firm cooperate with partners for 
technological innovation? If yes, how important is the cooperation (with each partner) for 
your innovation (on a five-point scale)?” Out of the total 538 firms, 40.1% or 216 firms had a 
positive answer regarding cooperation with at least one partner. According to the type of 
partner, universities and GRIs rank fourth (139, 25.8%) and fifth (129, 24.0%), respectively, 
in terms of number and percentage, and they rank third (3.32 point) in terms of the degree 













<Table 1-1> Technological cooperation according to partner (n=538) 
Partners No. of firms(%) Degree of importance*(point) 
Affiliated firms 113 (21.0) 3.42 
Clients 161 (29.9) 3.66 
Suppliers (raw materials) 161 (29.9) 3.32 
Suppliers (components/SW) 142 (26.4) 3.03 
Competitors 122 (22.7) 2.88 
Joint venture 94 (17.5) 2.84 
Business service firms 101 (18.8) 2.74 
Universities 139 (25.8) 3.32 
Public research institutes 129 (24.0) 3.32 
Public research laboratories 116 (21.6) 3.06 
Research associations 99 (18.4) 2.45 
Research cooperatives 92 (17.1) 1.00 
Private research institutes 95 (17.7) 2.53 
           Note: * The average value of the firms that cooperate with corresponding partners. 
 
In comparison with the 2005 KIS (2002-2004), university (18%) is the most important 
partner, out of 10, for technological innovation. They are followed by client (15%), supplier 
(14%), competitor (11%), and GRI (11%). Even in terms of degree of importance, university 
receives the highest score. This result partly reflects a change in the status of university as 




II. NIS and IUG Linkages in Korea 
 
1. IUG Linkages in the NIS  
 
(1) National Innovation System (NIS) 
 
The concept of the national innovation system (NIS) was proposed by Freeman (1987) 
and Lundvall (1992) in the 1980s. Freeman defines the NIS as a “network of institutions in 
the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and 
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diffuse new technologies.” Lundvall defines it as the “elements and relationships which 
interact in the production, diffusion, and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge… 
and are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state.” He broadens the 
concept of Freeman to include economic structure and institutional set-up that affect 
searching, learning, and adapting into the definition of the NIS. Meanwhile, Nelson (1993) 
defines the NIS as a “set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance… of national firms.” In a comparison to the NIS of 15 countries, he argues 
that the differences among these countries reflect different institutional arrangements. 
The NIS deals with the issue of how a nation can establish an efficient system for 
learning and innovation: how efficient can firm, university, and GRI be in creating new or 
acquiring external knowledge, and how efficient is this knowledge being diffused and 
utilized by other institutional actors? The definitions of the NIS are somewhat varied, but 
have common characteristics. First, the NIS is composed of various patterns of innovation 
by institutional actors, and its specific contents are different according to country. The 
difference affects the direction or speed of a nation’s innovation. Second, the NIS 
emphasizes on ’learning’ and ‘learning by doing.’ National competitiveness is enhanced 
when new knowledge is diffused to be shared both by the individual and the nation as a 
whole. Third, the NIS describes the role of university or research institute as channeling its 
knowledge to firm. It emphasizes the labor mobility as the most efficient mechanism in the 
creation, diffusion and utilization of knowledge. Here, university functions as a knowledge 
diffuser, by producing quality students or by interacting with firm or research institute 
through cooperative research programs.  
The diffusion and utilization as well as the creation of knowledge itself become more 
diverse and complicated. This means that the economic or social role of university or its 
link to institutional actors becomes more important than in the past. In this context, the next 
extends the theoretical framework of the NIS to emphasize the role of university in the 
knowledge-based economy.       
 
(2) The Triple-Helix Thesis vs. the New Economics of Science 
 
Regarding the role of university in a national economy, there exists a contrasting 
argument between two streams, the Triple Helix Thesis and the New Economics of Science 
(Eun et al., 2006).7 They narrow down the perspectives of the NIS to focus on the role of 
university in a nation.  
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) introduce a triple-helix model of industry-university-
government relations with an emphasis on both social and economic roles of university. 
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Here, the interactions among three are keys to facilitating conditions for innovation. The 
institutional actors exist both independently and partly overlapped in terms of their 
functions, and simultaneously each takes the roles of the other, thus hybrid organizations 
emerging at interfaces. This thesis suggests four processes regarding the changes in 
technological innovation: (1) the internal transformation in each of the helices, (2) the 
influence of one institutional sphere on another in bringing about transformation, (3) the 
creation of a new overlay of trilateral linkages, networks, and organizations among the 
three helices, and (4) the recursive effect of these inter-institutional networks (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 2000). 
The Triple-Helix thesis argues that university needs to be directly linked to industry in 
order to maximize the commercialization of knowledge. This emphasizes on the “third 
mission” of the university to economic development, as well as teaching and research 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). In a comparative study on Europe, Latin America, and Asia, 
Etzkowitz et al. (2000) conclude that the “entrepreneurial university“ is a global 
phenomenon. On the other hand, the New Economics of Science (Dasgupta & David, 1994) 
worries about the relationships between university and industry becoming too close. This 
argues that they may be detrimental to the scientific potentials of a nation, suggesting the 
indirect links between the two, such as education. Referring to the different functions of 
university and industry in a society, this underlines the proper division of labor between 
these institutional actors. 
As pointed out above, each country has its own NIS, so it is natural that the industry-
university linkages of each country take various forms, assuming different functions in a 
nation. In this respect, the IUG linkages in Korea should be understood in the Korean 
context, specifically, the Korean innovation system. 
 
2. The Evolution of the NIS and IUG Linkages 
 
The NIS of Korea is characterized as being government-led, so its industry-university 
or GRI linkages have evolved with the influences of science and technology (S&T) policy 
(MOST, 2007). In the 1960s, after the Japanese colonization for 36 years and the Korean 
War of 1950~1953, Korea was left with no industrial infrastructure, and its government 
initiated economic development through the Five-Year Economic Plan. In this period, the 
government set up legal and organizational frameworks for S&T: the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) were 
established in 1966 and 1967, respectively; the Science and Technology Promotion Law 
was enacted in 1967. Mechanical and skilled labor education was given importance. 
In the 1970s, Korea was in transition from light to heavy and chemical industries, and 
the government’s export-oriented policy stimulated the production of labor-intensive 
industries, e.g. footwear or textile. Due to the weak R&D capacity of both industry and 
university, the Korean government tried to promote national R&D capacity by establishing 
GRIs: a number of GRIs were established, based on the Special Research Institute 




Promotion Law of 1973, in the fields of machinery, shipbuilding, chemical engineering, 
marine science, and electronics. Noticeably, chaebol firms started to grow rapidly on the 
basis of heavy and chemical industries from the mid-1970s. For this, the government 
selected to provide a few chaebol firms with exclusive advantages. Engineering and 
scientist education was given importance, as well. 
In the 1980s, faced regulations on technology transfers by advanced countries, the 
Korean government placed a priority on the building of national R&D capacity (Kim, 1993). 
It started the National R&D programs in 1982 with an emphasis on large-scale national 
projects, in which GRI played a role as major institutes: several ministries (including relevant 
organizations) were involved in the programs with a large amount of R&D budget and 
investment.8 It is since then that the industry-university or GRI cooperation in Korea has 
being proceeding through specific programs.9 An example is the DRAM semiconductor, 
co-developed by private firms and the Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute (ETRI) to catch up with advanced countries (Lee & Lim, 2001). From the mid-1980s, 
the R&D capacity of university and, particularly, industry grew up: big firms, chaebols, 
started in-house R&D by hiring quality scientists and engineers from abroad or by 
acquiring technology in collaboration with foreign partners; university shifted towards 
being research based, conducting joint R&D with firms. As a result, the role of GRI 
subsequently became smaller than it used to be. 
Korea, as a catch-up country, emphasized the imitation rather than creation of 
technology, and chaebol firms led technological innovations benefited from the large-scale 
investment in R&D and the government’s selective support (Lim, 2006). Kim (1997) states 
that the dynamic growth in the Korean economy was possible during this period, through 
the aggressive creation and accumulation of technological capabilities by chaebol firms. On 
the other hand, this chaebols-led innovation dichotomized firms into two-strong large firms 
and weak small firms, which became a chronic problem for the economy (Lim, 2006; Choi et 
al., 2007). Actually, in 1996, the top 30 largest chaebols accounted for 40% of Korea’s total 
outputs, and business groups, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and Daewoo had 80 affiliates 
under their roofs (Ungson et al, 1997). 
In the 1990s, the R&D capacity of university as well as industry grew remarkably. 
Since the 1990s, the ranking of Korea has been rising in terms of the number of SCI papers 
to which university has contributed significantly: Korea ranked 19th in 1996 with university 
accounting for 83.0% of the contributions (Lee, 1998). However, GRI could not catch up 
with the level or speed of development in university in the late 1990s, in contrast to its great 
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role in the 1970s~1980s (Song, 2004).10 In this period, infrastructures for the regional 
innovation system (RIS) have been established, with various forms of industry-university 
linkages, such as SRC/ERC and Techno-parks. 
 
3. Knowledge Commercialization 
 
(1) Legal and Institutional Development in the 2000s  
 
Since the enactment of the Technology transfer Promotion Law of 2001, Korean 
university has had interests in knowledge commercialization (KRF, 2007). This Law 
prescribes that public university should establish units or institutions that are in charge of 
technology transfer to support for the training of specialists. Based on this, university began 
to set up industry-university cooperation foundations within themselves. 
However, it is after 2003, with the enactment of the Laws on Industrial Education and 
Industry-University Cooperation, that these foundations were built to function actively,11 
thus visualizing the performance of technology transfer or commercialization. Most of all, 
on the basis of the Laws, the intellectual property rights on university research got to belong 
to universities. Since then, several programs have been created in support of knowledge 
commercialization. 
 
(2) Technology Transfer 
 
According to a survey by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE) in 
2006,12 60% or 153 out of 256 public research organizations surveyed possess technology. 
As of 2005, they retain a total of 42,213 technologies, and only in 2005 did they create 
7,774 new ones. The number of new technologies created by university in 2005 alone 
exceeded that by GRI, although the accumulated number by the former was smaller than 
that by the latter. This implies that university is currently more active in developing new 
technology than in the past. 
As of 2005, 20.7% or 8,754 out of the total 42,213 technologies of public organizations 
are transferred to firms, recording an increase of 2.2% as compared to that of the previous 
year. The rate of technology transfer by university, 9.3%, is much lower than that by GRI, 
30.0%, but its rate trend increases from 8.2 of 2004. 
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satellites, during that period, but doubts if it would continue to perform well in response to the demands of 
the government and industry in the 21st century. 
11 Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs) have a short history, which initiated in 1999 under the support of 
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12 The MOCIE (2006) surveyed 114 GRIs and 145 universities on the current situation of technology transfer. 
98.8%, 256, out of 259 organizations have responded.  




In terms of the type of transfer, public research organizations use license the most, 
followed by sale and technical training/advice. Out of the 1,580 technologies transferred in 
2005, licensing account for 89.4% (1,413), sales for 7.4% (116), and technical 
training/advice for 3.2% (51). Regarding royalties, for a total of 68.7 trillion won, 62.9 
trillion won was generated from licensing, 4.0 trillion won from sales, and 1.8 trillion won 
from technical training/advice. Unlike sale or license, university provides more technical 
training/advice, 34, than GRI does, 17. 
The royalties from technology transfer have accumulated to 564.9 trillion won as of 
2005, a 44.3% increase from the 390.6 trillion won accumulated by 2002. In 2005 alone, 
they recorded 68.7 trillion. GRI accounted for 95.8% of the total amount or 541.5 trillion 
won, and university, 4.2% or 23.5 trillion won. Although the royalties from university are 
lower than those from GRI, its rate trend increased from 2.9% in 2002 to 10% in 2005.  
In comparison to advanced countries, the knowledge commercialization of public 
research organizations is not active in Korea (<Table 2-1>). As of 2005, the average number 
of employees in TLOs is 4.2, about half of that of the U.S. (8.2). The rate of technology 
transfer measured as a ratio of the number of technologies transferred to that developed is 
20.3%, which is smaller than that of the U.S. (28.3%). In the case of R&D productivity 
measured as a ratio of royalty from technology transfer to R&D expenditure, the ratio is 
1.1%, which is also smaller than that of the U.S. (3.5%) and Japan (1.4%). These 
differences result from the lack of recognition or experience in technology transfers on the 


























<Table 2-1> Comparisons in the performance of technology transfer (as of 2006) 
Korea U.S.*  
Univ. GRIs Total Univ. GRIs Total 
Japan 
** 
Average no. of employees  
In TLOs  
4.8 3.6 4.2 8.7 6.1 8.2 14.3 
*** 
Number of technology 
developments (A) 
4,616 3,158 7,774 15,002 1,790 16,792 8,725 
Number of  
technology transfers (B) 
629 951 1,580 4,087 671 4,758 1,171 
Rate of technology transfer 
(%) (B/A) 
13.6 30.1 20.3 27.2 37.5 28.3 13.4 
Royalty from technology 
transfer ($hundred million) 
(C) 
3.2 53.3 56.5 1,088 346 1,435 n.a. 
R&D expenditure 
($hundred million) (D) 
2,200 2,964 5,164 37,162 4,082 41,244 47,200 
R&D productivity (%) 
(C/D) 
0.2 1.8 1.1 2.9 8.5 3.5 n.a. 
Note: 1) Base year: Korea (2005); U.S. (2004); Japan (2003) 
              2) Surveyed organizations: Korea (145 universities, 111 GRIs); U.S. (164 universities, 33 GRIs);  
Japan (universities and GRIs, 63) 
                  3) * AUTM. Licensing Survey: FY 2004 
                ** Japan Patent Office (2003 & 2004) 
                *** Full-time Non-teaching staff (Technical personnel)/Collage of technology 
Source: MOCIE (2006). A Survey on the Technology Transfers of Public Research Organization.  
 
 
III. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
  
1. The Determinants of IUG Linkages: Hypothesis 1 
 
In recognizing intra-firm limitations, extensive literature emphasizes the advantages of 
external cooperation for advancing new technologies. The Transaction cost economics 
(Pisano, 1990) describes alliances as a “hybrid form of organization between arm’s-length 
transactions in the market and hierarchical transactions within the firm”: the former entails 
high transaction costs, especially when technology is tacit; the latter limits access to 
specialist know-how while saving the costs. This theory points out that firms face the 
reciprocity that may minimize opportunism between partners.13 The Resource-based theory 
states that internal resources play an important role in a firm’s decision (Penrose 1959; 
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Richardson 1972); the firm tends to engage in cooperation with partners when capital, 
technology, and human capital are interdependent. Industry-university cooperation has been 
discussed as one type of R&D cooperation in these contexts. According to Geisler (1995), 
the more recognized the fact that they are interdependent in terms of resources, the higher 
the possibility that university and firm establish partnerships. On the other hand, as Santoro 
(2000) and Freel et al. (2006) argue that, in spite of their importance in research, firm often 
looks for other partners not university in pursuing technological initiatives, due to the 
mismatch of research interests between them.  
In regard to industry-university cooperation, particular, sector characteristics matter. 
Pavitt (1984) argues that learning from advancements in technology is crucial for science-
based industries, e.g. electronics and chemicals, for which industry-university is 
particularly significant. Much literature also underlines the importance of this cooperation 
in these industries, because they rely heavily on basic/core technology for firms’ innovation 
(Meyer-Krahmer & Ulrich Schmoch, 1998; Santoro & Chakrabati, 2002; Schartinger et al., 2002). 
Besides, the government’s policy is emphasized as being crucial for technology transfer. 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, often cited as the legislation for facilitating the growth in 
university patenting of the U.S., is an example: the Act allows the IPR on university results 
conducted by public funds to belong to university. Since then, OECD countries, such as 
France, Denmark, Canada and Japan, have emulated it to legislate or adopt similar policies 
to utilize academic research for commercial advantages (Mowery & Sampat, 2005; OECD, 
2003). 
Based on the above discussions, our grand hypothesis is that IUG cooperation in Korea 
is determined by firm characteristics, sector characteristics and government’s support 
measures for R&D.     
 
(1) Firm Characteristics 
 
Firm size: Firm size is an impetus to a firm’s decision in R&D cooperation. Large firms 
can cooperate with partners more effectively than small firms, thereby benefiting from their 
internal resources (Tether, 2002). On the contrary, there exist a number of studies that argue 
otherwise: small firms tend to be more eager for external cooperation than large firms as 
they face lack of internal resources, especially financial, R&D capacity or facility. In 
empirical analyses, like the theories, the impact of firm size on the firm’s decision in 
cooperation with university or GRI is obscure. 
In this study, firm size (SIZE) is measured as a log value of the average number of 
employees during 2000~2001. Unlike previous studies, it uses an average value, not a 
single one for 2001. In the case of Korea, the mean firm size is larger for firms that 
cooperate with university and GRI (5.27 and 5.30), respectively, rather than otherwise (5.02 
and 5.01). The t-ratio is 2.23 (p=0.03) for university and 2.56 (p=0.01) for GRI, implying the 
significant difference in firm size between cooperators and non-cooperators (<Table 3-1>). 




Therefore, based on the above discussions, we will test if firm size affects the firm’s 
propensity of cooperating with them. 
 
R&D intensity: R&D intensity matters as the absorptive capacity of a firm that 
maximizes benefits from R&D cooperation (Fontana et al., 2006). Firms, whose R&D 
capacities are large enough to easily absorb external knowledge, are willing to obtain 
benefits from it. However, the opposite can occur: these firms may substitute external 
cooperation by developing technology independently (Love & Roper, 1999). In this case, the 
smaller the R&D capacity, the more pursuant the firm is to cooperate with partners. Like 
the empirical analyses for firm size, those for the impact of R&D intensity show obscure 
results. 
In this study, R&D intensity (RD_INT) is measured as a ratio of average R&D 
expenditure during 2000~2001 to sales in 2001. The log mean of R&D intensity is slightly 
higher for firms in cooperation with university (5.47%) and GRI (5.94%), respectively, than 
otherwise (2.99% and 2.91%). Accordingly, the difference is not significant as seen from the 
t-ratios of each (1.12 (p=0.26) and 1.28 (p=0.20)) (<Table 3-1>). Therefore, based on the above 
discussions, we will test if R&D intensity affects the firm’s propensity of cooperating with 
them. 
 
Cooperation objectives: Cooperation objectives constitute a part of firm capacity. 
Scientific knowledge tends to entail high costs and uncertainty: developing new knowledge 
for itself or the market, an innovative firm bears high costs in the initial stage but face 
uncertainty in demands (Jensen et al., 2003). In the empirical analyses, both Belderbos et al. 
(2004) and Veugelers et al. (2005) reveal that the cost-sharing objective has a positive 
impact on the firm’s decision in cooperating with university. However, regarding the risk-
sharing objective, they obtain a negative result. Some case studies point out that firms tend 
to cooperate with university for cost-sharing benefits rather than risk-sharing purposes (Park 
et al., 2000).  
The cost-sharing objective (COST) and risk-sharing objective (RISK) are measured 
based on the answers to the following question of the KIS: “What is the weight of the 
following as a barrier to technological innovation (on a five-point scale)?” Among 23 
hindrance factors to innovation, the weight of excessive risk or uncertainty is used for the 
RISK variable and that of excessive high cost for innovation or commercialization, for the 
COST variable. The mean score of these two cooperation objectives is much higher for 
firms that are engaged in this cooperation than otherwise (<Table 3-1>): university (3.14 vs. 
2.08) and GRI (3.22 vs. 2.09) for cost-sharing objectives, and university (3.17 vs. 2.20) and 
GRI (3.26 vs. 2.19) for risk-sharing objectives. The t-ratio is statistically significant for the 
cost-sharing objective (8.58 (p=0.00) and 9.27 (p=0.00)) and the risk-sharing objective (7.72 
(p=0.00) and 8.66 (p=0.00)), implying the existence of differences between cooperators and 
non-cooperators in terms of their cooperation objectives. Therefore, we hypothesize that the 




more important the cooperation objective, the higher the firm’s probability of cooperating 
with them. 
 
Affiliation to Business Groups: Affiliated firms are legally independent, but work as 
“operating divisions” that are controlled by their groups (Chang & Hong, 2000). The authors 
argue that the superior financial performance of Korean chaebols is relevant to group- as 
well as firm-level resources. Chaebols are technologically diversified compared with non-
chaebols (Choo, 2006), and they can provide a broader technological base for their affiliates. 
Choo et al. (2006) supports this, saying that business groups can maintain advantages of 
their capacities when the technology is “lumpy or indivisible.” An affiliate can obtain 
technology from its group, thus feeling no need for cooperating with university or GRI. On 
the other hand, this may benefit from the brand name, resource, or network of their 
headquarters, thus making IUG cooperation easier than otherwise (Tether, 2002). Belderbos 
et al. (2004) empirically prove that firms belonging to a group tend to cooperate with 
university. On the other hand, Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) reveal the opposite result, that is, 
the negative impact of this affiliation, interpreting it such that affiliates cooperate with 
university only through their headquarters while headquarters do directly. 
Affiliation to business groups (GROUP) is measured in two ways. One is based on the 
answer to the following question of the KIS: “Your firm is of which type, independent, 
domestic, or a foreign affiliate?” GROUP is measured as a dummy, 1 if it is either a 
domestic or a foreign affiliate, or 0 otherwise. The mean percentage of firms affiliated to 
business groups is lower for firms that cooperate with university or GRI (12.03 and 10.66) 
rather than otherwise (13.79 and 14.18). However, the t-ratio of each is -0.68 (p=0.50) and -
1.29 (p=0.20), and the difference is not statistically significant (<Table 3-1>). The other 
measurement is chaebol. CHAEBOL10 and CHAEBOL11-30 refer to the top 10 and 11~30 
firms as designated by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC). The mean percentage of firms 
affiliated to business groups is almost similar for firms that cooperate with university or 
GRI, and the difference between cooperators and non-cooperators is not statistically 
significant with the t-ratio of 0.52 (p=0.61) and 0.66 (p=0.51), respectively. Therefore, based 
on the above, I will test if affiliation to group or chaebol5 decreases the firm’s probability 
of cooperating with university and GRI, respectively.  
 
Firm Location: In spite of developments in communication means, firm location, or 
geographic proximity to university is still an issue in industry-university cooperation. Those 
firms in the same region as universities can have easy access to technology or employ 
quality scientists from the universities. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) emphasize the 
geographic proximity in terms of specific roles played by scientists, e.g. technology 
transfers. This is particularly important if knowledge is tacit, in that its transfer can be 
facilitated by face-to-face communication (Pisano et al., 1988). Jaffe (1986) suggests that the 
closer the proximity of university research to corporate laboratories, the more probable the 
potency of spillovers from university. Acs et al. (1994) argue that firms receive R&D 




spillovers from the knowledge of university or large counterpart. Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2001) underline “regional agglomeration effects”–geographical proximity between firms 
and public research institutes - in the growth of high-technology clusters in the U.S. 
Due to data limitation, we use region dummies instead of geographic proximity to 
reflect firm location. The KIS presents sixteen regions, and this analysis groups them into 
eight. Firm location is measured as a dummy, 1 if a firm is located in a specific region and 
0 otherwise. It is found that 56.5% of all firms are located in the Metropolitan area, 
followed by Kyungsang-namdo (16.7%), Kyungsang-bukdo (9.5%), Choongchung-namdo 
(5.8%), Choongchung-bukdo (4.8%), and so on.  
 
(2) Sector Characteristics  
 
Sector characteristics are emphasized in the fields of technological innovation or catch-
up. Marlerba (2005) defines the sectoral system of innovation (SSI) as a “set of agents 
carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation and sale of sectoral 
products.” He suggests the following four theoretical blocks of the SSI: 1) regimes of 
knowledge and technology; 2) demand conditions (or marker regimes); 3) actors and 
networks, and the coordination among them; and 4) surrounding institutions including IPRs, 
laws, culture, and so on.  
Much literature states that the specific patterns of innovation activities are determined 
by technological regimes. Breschi et al. (2000) define a technological regime as the 
combination of technological opportunities, appropriability of innovations, cumulativeness 
of technical advancements, and properties of the knowledge base. They empirically prove 
that Schumpeter Mark I, “creative destruction,” is related to the low degree of 
cumulativeness and appropriability, the high importance of applied sciences, and the 
increasing role of external sources of knowledge, while Schumpeter Mark II, “creative 
accumulation,” is vise versa. Lee and Lim (2001) study the technological regimes of 
selected industries in Korea and find that “leapfrogging” was possible for CDMA mobile 
phone and DRAM, which were benefited from R&D projects combining private and public 
capacities and entries to new industries in cooperation with foreign firms. Park and Lee 
(2004) analyze the relationship between technological regime and technological catch-up 
using U.S. patent data and find that catch-up countries tend to make high growths in the 
technological sectors with a shorter cycle time, easier access to knowledge, and higher 
appropriability. Moreover, technological innovation in Korea, as they prove, is 
characterized by low appropriability and high cumulativeness. 
The Industrial organization literature is interested in how the imperfect appropriability 
of innovation outcomes affects the incentives for a firm’s innovation: appropriability 
increases benefits from R&D cooperation when incoming spillovers are high enough, 
which is on the contrary when there are inducements for a free-rider. However, due to the 
generic characteristics of knowledge, industry-university cooperation tends to be less 
involved in this issue compared to industry-competitor or supplier cooperation (Veugelers & 




Cassiman, 2005). Instead, IPR regime matters in this field, reflecting technology or sector 
characteristics that determine the effectiveness of an industry’s legal appropriability 
regimes. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) empirically verify that the effective IPR regime 
facilitates the firm’s propensity of cooperating with universities, while its strategic 
protection, such as secrecy or lead time, does not. 
We set up the IPR regime as a sector variable, because it is specific or more related to 
IUG cooperation rather than others, e.g. industry dummies. The IPR regime (IN_IPR) is 
measured based on the answers to the following question of the KIS: “How important are 
the following as protection methods for IPR (on a five-point scale)?” Among four methods, 
patent is used for this variable. IN_IPR is measured as the industry average, following the 
idea of Veugelers and Cassiman (2005). In the case of Korea, the mean score of the IPR 
regime is higher for firms that cooperate with universities (2.09) than otherwise (1.99), with 
a t-ratio of 3.01 (p=0.0) (<Table 3-1>). However, the mean score is slightly higher for 
cooperators with GRIs (2.07) than non-cooperators (2.00), and the difference is not 
statistically significant as evident in the t-ratio of 2.16 (p=0.03). Therefore, a test whether 
the IPR regime matters for the firm’s probability of cooperating with them will be done. 
 
(3) Government’s Policy Measures 
 
Government’s support: Government’s supports for R&D are helpful for firms that need 
external partnerships but face financial or networking problems. The government may 
provide those firms with capitals for acquiring basic or core technology from university or 
GRI or with opportunities for collaborating on research projects with them (Mohnen & 
Hoareau, 2003). In the case of national R&D programs in Korea, specific projects require 
firms to participate with them14 and to report their research results as the number of patents 
filed. The measures, as a result, can facilitate the firm’s probability of IUG cooperation. 
Both Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) and Capron and Cinccera (2003) prove that firms, which 
use the government’s support measures, tend to cooperate with these public research 
organizations. 
Government’s support (G_SUP) is measured based on the answers to the following 
question of the KIS: “Which government’s support measure does your firm use?” Among 
the nine, whether a firm participates with national R&D projects or not is used for this 
variable. This variable is 1 if a firm participates with national R&D projects and 0 
otherwise. As seen from <Table 3-1>, the mean percentage of firms that use government 
support is higher among firms that cooperate with universities and GRIs (66.17 and 73.13), 
                                            
14 As of 2005, joint research projects, a part of the Programs, conducted through industry-university or GRI 
cooperation accounted for 61.2% (15,829) of the total projects (25,877) and 58.9% (3,737 trillion won) of 
the total R&D expenditure (6,339 trillion won). According to the type of cooperation, industry-university-
GRI cooperation ranked first, accounting for 16.9% of the projects or 1,069 trillion won of the R&D 
expenditure. It was followed by industry-university cooperation, 11.8% or 748 trillion won, and industry-
GRI cooperation, 7.1% or 452 trillion won (NSTC, 2006).   




respectively, rather than otherwise (30.53 and 29.67). The t-ratio of each is 7.95 (p=0.00) and 
9.43 (p=0.00), and thus, the difference is statistically significant. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that government’s supports for R&D facilitate the firm’s probability of IUG 
cooperation. 
Table 3-1> Statistics on the possible determinants of IUG cooperation 
  Industry-university cooperation Industry-GRI cooperation 
  Cooperation Non-cooperation Cooperation 
Non-
cooperation 






Firm size (log of employees) 5.27 5.02 2.23 (0.03)** 5.3 5.01 
2.56 
(0.01)** 
R&D intensity (%) 5.47 2.99 1.12 (0.26) 5.94 2.91 
1.28 
(0.20) 
% of firms belonging to group  11.51 13.78 -0.68 (0.50) 10.08 14.18 
-1.29 
(0.20) 
% of firms belonging to the top 10 
chaebol group 4.32 2.06 
1.09 
(0.28) 3.88 2.44  
0.99 
(0.45) 
% of firms belonging to the top 11-
30 chaebol group 1.44 3.26 
-1.35 
(0.18) 1.55 3.18 
-1.17 
(0.24) 
Cost-sharing objective (point) 3.14 2.08 8.58 (0.00)*** 3.22 2.09 
9.27 
(0.00)*** 
Risk-sharing objective (point) 3.17 2.2 7.72 (0.00)*** 3.26 2.19 
8.66 
(0.00)*** 
% of firms using National R&D 
Programs 0.67 0.31 
7.95 
(0.00)*** 0.73 0.3 
9.43 
(0.00)*** 
IPR regime (point) 2.09 1.99 3.01 (0.00)*** 2.07 2 
2.16 
(0.03)** 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis present p-value.  
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
2. The Impacts of the Linkages on Firm Performance 
 
(1) Innovation Probability: Hypothesis 2 
 
Knowledge is different from technology in terms of “purpose, degree of codification, 
type of storage and degree of observability” (Landry et al., 2007): the former is tacit stored in 
people’s head, intangible with the imprecise impact of its use, and concretizing theories and 
principles; the latter is codified in software or blueprint, tangible with the precise impact of 
its use, and changing technological environments. Namely, technology transfer is 
considered as the limited activities of knowledge transfer. 
Unlike the technology from private firms, a large part of the knowledge from university 




is transferred to firms informally,15 although previous studies have focused mainly on 
citations (Spencer 2001), patents (Hall & Ziedonis), and spin-offs (Link & Scott, 2005). This is 
particularly the case in Korea, in which education or consulting is more prevalent than 
others. So, due to their characteristics of knowledge or way of knowledge transfer, 
industry-university cooperation may not directly influence the firms’ success in innovation; 
rather, it can affect their decision or management of research projects (George et al., 2002; 
Mowery & Sampat, 2005). Actually, many studies that have tried to conceptualize knowledge 
transfer from university emphasize on its activities of affecting decision-making processes 
rather than generating tangible technological products (Knott and Wildasky, 1980; Lester & 
Wilds, 1990). 
The impact of industry-university cooperation, as the intermediate stage of research and 
commercialization, is empirically obscure. Based on a CIS data of 1,460 French firms, 
Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) find that cooperation with university (foreign rather than 
domestic) increases the probability of radical innovation, while spillover from university 
does not.1617 On the other hand, Sung (2005)’s study in Korea, using a KIS data of 1,120 
firms, finds that this cooperation does not affect the innovation probability of Korean firms 
in general. 
In this study, innovation probability is measured as 1 if a firm does technological 
innovation and 0 otherwise. In Korea, 26.0% or 139 out of 538 firms have cooperation with 
university, of which 93.5% or 131 do technological innovation (<Table 3-2>). However, 
79.1% or 260 out of 399 firms, which have no cooperation with it, do technological 
innovation. In the case of GRI, 24.0% or 129 firms of the total have cooperation with it, of 
which 94.3% or 123 do technological innovation. However, 81.4% or 268 of 409 firms, 
which have no cooperation with them, do technological innovation.  
On the basis of the above discussions, the second hypothesis of this thesis is 







                                            
15 For example, Landry et al. (2007), based on a data of 1,554 researchers, find that Canadian researchers are 
more actively involved in non-commercial knowledge transfer rather than commercial one, less involved in 
intellectual property right. 
16 Technological spillovers are often defined as “non-appropriable amounts of knowledge” transmitted 
voluntarily or involuntarily (Monjon & Waelbroeck, 2003). Regarding industry-university cooperation, the 
literature refers to indirect or informal interactions between them: Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) regard0 
publications and discussions at conferences as channels of knowledge transmission from universities to 
industries; Gibbons and Johnston (2000) treat scientific papers and contacts with scientists as the most 
important sources of academic knowledge. 
17 They measure spillover as the degree of the importance of university as a source of information. 




<Table 3-2> IUG cooperation and technological innovation 
(unit: no. of firms) 









Innovators 131 260 123 268 
 
 
(2) Innovation Sale vs. Patent Filed: Hypothesis 3   
  
University’s research and development is characterized as being new or creative. 
Previous literature underlines the fact that industry-university cooperation contributes to 
radical innovation, which is new not only to the ‘firm’ but also to the ‘market’ (Monjon & 
Waelbroeck, 2003) or to the creation of ‘new competencies’ (Faems et al., 2005). On the 
contrary, industry-industry cooperation contributes to incremental innovation, which is new 
to the ‘firm’ or to the improvement of ‘existing competencies.’ This implies that the former 
has a higher possibility of leading to more patents or generating new products. 
This is supported by Belderbos et al.’s study (2004) that is based on the Dutch CIS I and 
II of 2,056 firms. They empirically prove that both formal cooperation and spillover from 
university18 facilitate the growth in innovative sales, concluding that university is important 
source of knowledge for radical innovation. Using the Belgian CIS II of 221 firms, Faems 
et al. (2005) examine two types of technological cooperation: the ‘explorative’ partnerships 
with university and GRI and the ’exploitative’ partnerships with client and supplier. They 
find that the presence and number of ’explorative’ partnerships improve the proportion of 
turnover generated by product innovation, while that of ’exploitative’ partnerships enhance 
product-improving innovation. George et al.’s study (2002), using a data of 2,457 alliances 
by 147 U.S. publicly traded biotechnology companies, reveal the significant impact of 
industry-university cooperation on patents. Considering the quality as well as quantity of 
university linkages, e.g. the number of Research-I university linkages or total federal R&D 
funding, they claim that firms with links to university perform better in terms of the number 
of patents as well as products in the market.  
One point should be noticed here. These studies are based on advanced countries where 
knowledge commercialization systems have been well developed, thus industry-university 
cooperation being directly linked to innovative sales. However, as seen in Chapter 2, the 
governance form of commercialization is not diverse in Korea, as a developing country. 
This implies the possibility that the impact of this cooperation is not fully revealed as sales 
as much as it is in advanced countries; rather, it could be done as patents which have a 
merit of being filed only with new idea within a short time or those which are less affected 
by knowledge commercialization systems. 
                                            
18 They measure spillovers as residuals from the auxiliary regression of spillover variables by partner 
(university, competitor, customer and supplier) in 1994 and 1996. 




Unlike on innovative outcomes, most studies report that university-industry cooperation 
has no significant impact on labor productivity (Belderbos et al., 2004; Monjon & Waelbroeck, 
2003). These studies interpret it such that labor productivity is affected directly by other 
factors, such as capital, rather than IUG cooperation. 
As for this subject, this paper considers only innovative firms that retain innovation 
outcomes, e.g. patents or sales. Firm performance is measured in three ways: the number of 
patents filed from each type of innovation, percentage in the sales of innovation outcomes 
produced from product innovation, and labor productivity. The first two as performance 
variables are based on the KIS, while the last one is based on the KIS VALUE database. In 
terms of the average number of patents filed from technological innovation, overall, it is 
higher for cooperators (7.31) than non-cooperators (5.26) with universities, but the 
difference is not significant (<Table 3-3>). However, in the case of GRI, cooperators have an 
average number of 10.48 patents, while non-cooperators have 3.88, and the difference is 
statistically significant with t=1.99 (p=0.05) (<Table 3-4>). Meanwhile, as to the means of 
percentage in the sales of innovation outcomes and labor productivity, no significant 
difference can be found between cooperators and non-cooperators.  
On the basis of the above discussions, the third hypothesis is formulated: in Korea, the 
impact of IUG cooperation is revealed in the form of patents rather than the sale of 
innovation outcomes or labor productivity. 
 
(3) Product innovation vs. Process Innovation: Hypothesis 4 
 
University is the institution that functions higher education with basic or long-term 
research interests, which is different from firms with practical or short-term market needs 
(Hoffman et al., 1998). This implies that industry-university cooperation may be helpful for 
product innovation, while industry-industry cooperation may for process innovation. 
Rouvinen (2002) supports this through an empirical analysis of CIS data from Finnish 
manufacturing firms: that is, industry-university or non-profit research organization 
contributes only to product innovation, while industry-client or supplier contributes to 
process innovation as well. He explains it such that process innovation benefits from the 
stocks of capital-embodied technology, while product innovation does from disembodied 
forms of technology.19 He also mentions the point that process innovation may constitute a 
part of product innovation rather than being patented. 
On the other hand, there exists the opposite argument: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(2000) state that science has been organized in pursuit of practical as well as theoretical 
interests; Nelson (2000) mentions that university research is keyed into practical 
technologies and particular industries. Freel and Harrison (2006) empirically prove the 
positive relationship between product innovation and industry-customer or GRI cooperation, 
and between process innovation and industry-supplier or university cooperation. They 
                                            
19 Evangelista (1999) differentiates disembodied technologies as a stock of knowledge or capabilities and 
embodied technologies as a stock of productive assets or fixed productive capitals. 




argue that, in spite of their influences on product innovation, universities are significant 
contributors to just the sort of “industry-relevant” research for manufacturing firms at least. 
A few papers point out that the IUG cooperation in Korea focuses on process rather 
than product innovation. For instance, Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI, 2006) 
reports that a large number of Korean firms participate in national R&D programs, focusing 
on problem-solving rather than new product or technology development. In the case studies 
of the IUG cooperation system of Po-hang Steel, an affiliate of POSCO, Park et al. (2000) 
find that this system focuses on problem solving, is centered on short-term projects, and 
mostly contributes to process and product improvement but partly to product innovation. Is 
this true then? If not, what is the reality?  
According to <Figure 1-1>, more Korean firms are engaged in product (342) rather than 
process innovation (239). Looking at the former in detail, more firms do product 
improvement (303) rather than new product innovation (251). In terms of firm performance, 
the average number of patents filed from new product innovation is higher for cooperators 
than non-cooperators with these public research organizations, with a t-ratio of 1.91 
(p=0.06) for university (<Figure 3-3>) and 1.92 (p=0.06) for GRI (<Figure 3-4>). This means 
that there exists a difference in the number of patents filed between the two. However, in 
spite of a large or larger number of firms engaged in process innovation, no significant 
difference is found in the number of patents filed between the two. On the basis of the 
above discussions, the fourth hypothesis is formulated: IUG cooperation contributes to 
product rather than process innovation. 
 
<Table 3-3> Industry-university cooperation and firm performance 

















innovation   
(n=130) (n=99) (n=115) (n=91) (n=261) (n=167) (n=207)  (n=155) 
No. of patent 7.31 5.92 1) 2.4 0.92 5.26 1.98 3.43 2.08 






















<Table 3-4> Industry-GRI and firm performance 

















innovation   
(n=122) (n=92) (n=108) (n=84) (n=269) (n=174) (n=214)  (n=162) 
No. of patent 10.48 6.08 1) 4.26 3.04 3.88 2.05 2.46 0.94 
% in sale 49.84 48.65 
Value added 




  68,948.57   





This section sets up empirical models for analysis. First, we analyze what determines a 
firm’s propensity of IUG cooperation, using the Probit model. 
                                  
IUGi = α0 + α1 Xi + u   (1) 
 
X = {SIZE, RD_INT, COST, RISK, GROUP (CAHEBOL10/CAHEBOL11-30), 
regional dummies (r_) IN_IPR, G_SUP} 
 
IUG indicates whether a firm cooperates with university and GRI, respectively: 1 if the 
firm cooperates with them and 0 otherwise. The model is specified by firm size (SIZE), 
R&D intensity (RD_INT), cooperation objective (COST and RISK), affiliation to business 
groups (GROUP), firm location (r_), IPR regime (IN_IPR), and government’s support 
measure (G_SUP). It also includes the top 10 chaebols (CHAEBOL10) and the top 11-30 
chaebols (CHAEBOL11-30) as a variable of affiliation to business groups. Here, marginal 
effects are estimated at the mean point.20 
Second, we test whether IUG cooperation affects the innovation probability of firms, 
using the Probit model. 
 
IUGi = β0 + β1Zi + β2Xi + u1   (2-1) 
 
P_INNOi = γ0 + γ1IUGi^ + γ2Xi + u2   (2-2) 
 
Z = {regional dummies (r_)}  
X = {SIZE, RD_INT, COST, RISK, GROUP, G_SUP,  
Demand-pull, Cost-push, AGE, OPENNESS, FOREIGN, industry dummies} 
                                            
20 Although Xi has a linear effect on unobservable IUGi*, it does not have a linear effect on the probability 
that IUGi =1. Therefore, the marginal effect varies with each Xi in the Probit model, while this is constant 
over the sample in the linear model (Baum, 2006). 





The innovation probability of firms is estimated by the eq. 2-2. P_INNO is 1 if a firm 
does technological innovation and 0 otherwise. The model is specified by the estimated 
IUG^, instead of IUG, and explanatory variables, X. 
Previous studies deal with this issue without considering the endogeneity of IUG 
cooperation measure. In contrast, bearing in mind that certain factors specific to IUG 
cooperation, e.g. technological capability of firms, indirectly affect firm performance, we 
try to control this endogeneity. If IUG is used instead of IUG^, this variable may be 
correlated with disturbance u2, and thus it is endogenous. The zero-covariance condition 
Cov[Xi, u2] = 0 is violated, and thereby, the zero-conditional-mean assumption E[u2| Xi] = 
0 does not hold anymore (Baum, 2006). As a result, OLS estimates become biased and 
inconsistent. Accordingly, we control the endogeneity by instrumenting for IUG that is 
uncorrelated with u2 but is highly correlated with IUG. We use regional dummies (r_) as 
instruments; IUG cooperation is active in the regions that universities and firms cluster, e.g., 
Seoul or Daejon, but the firms in there do not always perform better than otherwise. 
In the first stage, we regress IUG cooperation (IUG) on instrumental variables (Z) and 
exogenous variables (X) (eq. 2-1). In the second stage, we then regress the innovation 
probability of Korean firms (P_INNO) on the estimated or endogenous variable (IUG^) and 
exogenous variable (X) (eq. 2-2). The explanatory variables in eq. 2-2 include those of eq.1, 
except for region dummies, and additional variables—innovation objective (Demand-pull 
and Cost-push), firm age (AGE), openness (EXPORT), and foreign capital (FOREIGN). In 
order to control industry effect, industry dummies are used instead of IN_IPR, the sector 
variable in eq. 1. Innovation objective is based on the answers to the following question of 
the KIS: “What are the objectives of your firm to do technological innovation (on a five-
point scale)?” Demand-Pull is measured as the average of the degree of importance of 
product substitutions, market share increases and improvements in quality, and Cost-Push, 
as that of the degree of importance of flexibility increases, material costs, and labor cost 
reductions.21 AGE is measured as a log value of firm age. The openness of a firm, 
OPENNESS, is measured as a dummy variable, 1 if the firm exports in either 2000 or 2001 
and 0 otherwise. Foreign capital, FOREIGN, is measured as the average ratio of foreign 
capitals to total capitals. 
   Third, we analyze how IUG cooperation affects firm performance, with a sample 
selection model. 
 
P_INNOi = δ0 + δ1IUGi + δ2Xi + u1   (3-1) 
 
INNOi = ε0 + ε1IUGi + ε2Xi + u2   (3-2) 
 
                                            
21 Both demand pull and cost push are the major determinants of innovation outcomes, which are usually 
used in the CDM model (Crepon et al., 1998). 




X = {SIZE, RD_INT, GROUP, Demand-Pull, Cost-Push, AGE, OPENNESS, FOREIGN, 
industry dummies} 
 
Firm performance (INNO) is estimated by the eq. 3-2. For INNO, three types of 
variables are used, namely, the number of patents filed from each type of innovation, the 
percentage in sales of innovative outcomes produced from product innovation and the value 
added per worker. The model is specified by IUG and explanatory variables, X. 
Additionally, another industry dummies are considered here - high, medium-high, medium-
low, and low-technology, following the OECD classification (OECD, 2005) based on the 
levels of R&D intensity. 
This analysis deals with only innovative firms. In the KIS, only firms that do 
technological innovation are asked questions regarding how many patents or sales they 
make from each type of innovation. This means that performance variables, INNO, are 
censored based on whether they do technological innovation or not. Accordingly, a 
selection bias based on the unobserved characteristics of firms with the potential of doing 
technological innovation needs to be checked, and if any, it should be corrected. If OLS is 
applied without considering this sample selection bias, this selectivity may make the 
coefficients biased because the sample of firms is not a random one. 
In order to deal with this problem, we use Heckman’s 2SLS (1979), a two-step sample 
selection procedure. In the first stage, the corrective term, the inverse Miller’s ratio 
(IMILLS), is estimated as a prediction of the Probit model (eq. 3-1). Using these estimates, 
the inverse Miller’s ratio is calculated as a function of the standard normal density divided 
by the cumulative distribution function. The ratio is then used as an additional regressor in 





1. The Determinants of IUG Cooperation 
 
This part analyzes the determinants of IUG cooperation, using the Probit model. The 
dependent variable measures whether a firm cooperates with university and GRI, 
respectively, for its innovation: the variable is 1 if it does and 0 otherwise. 
<Table 5-1> reveals the results. Among firm characteristics, COST and regional 
dummies are statistically significant: the positive COST means that Korean firms tend to 
cooperate with university for cost- rather than risk-sharing objectives; the coefficient of 
regional dummies is significantly positive in general, implying the importance of firm 
location in their decision. On the other hand, neither SIZE nor RD_INT is statistically 
significant, which means that none of them is deterministic to this cooperation.22 In terms 
                                            
22 In regard to R&D intensity, Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) and Capron and Cincera (2003) point out that, 
due to too short period during which study is conducted, firms’ investment in R&D may not fully affect 




of the affiliation to business group, GROUP is negative, but not statistically significant 
(Model 1). However, when chaebols are defined as the top 11~30 firms, the result is 
noticeable: the coefficient of CHAEBOL11-30 is significantly negative (Model 3). In 
comparison, the coefficient of CHAEBOL10 is positive, but not statistically significant. 
These imply that middle-leveled chaebols tend not to cooperate with university, while top-
leveled chaebols may do: the top-leveled chaebols have richer resources, consequently to 
cooperate with university in various forms.23 Namely, group firms normally feel a need for 
this cooperation less than others as the literature mentions (Mohnen & Hoareau, 2003; Capron 
& Cincera, 2003), but this is applicable only to middle-leveled chaebols IN_IPR, as sector 
characteristics, is statistically significant as the literature refers to (Veugelers & Cassiman, 
2005), which means that the more efficient the IPR regime, the higher the firms’ probability 
of cooperating with university. The coefficient of G_SUP is significantly positive, which 
implies that the government’s support measures for R&D, specifically national R&D 
programs, really encourage firms to cooperate with university. It also confirms that the 
industry-university cooperation, broadly speaking the NIS of Korea, is characterized as 
being government-led. 
The determinants of industry-GRI cooperation are similar to those of industry-
university cooperation, except RISK, regional dummies, and IN_IPR. The coefficient of 
RISK is significantly positive, implying that Korean firms are likely to cooperate with GRI 
for risk-sharing. Regional impact is significant too, but relatively weaker than that of 
industry-university cooperation. Moreover, IN_IPR is statistically insignificant, which 














                                                                                                                                     
their propensity for cooperating with universities. 
23 Besides joint or contract research, chaebols, such as Samsung, LG or GM Daewoo, offer university 
students classes or programs in order to be directly linked to internship or business sector, or provide 
financial and technical supports for research in the fields of basic science. On the other hand, SMEs, which 
are relatively project-based or lack financial capacity, tend to cooperate with university mainly through 
joint or contract research. 





<Table 5-1> The determinants of industry-university cooperation (Probit model) 
Industry-university cooperation Industry-GRI cooperation   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 






















GROUP -0.23 (-1.17)     
-0.31 
(-1.52)     
CHAEBOL10   0.26 (0.68)     
0.08 
(0.19)   
CHAEBOL11-30     -0.93 (-2.02)**     
-0.84 
(-1.79)* 














































































































       
No. of obs 538 538 538 538 538 538 
McFadden R^2 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.19 
Log likelihood -260.29 -260.77 -258.64 -241.15 -243.32 -240.5 
Pro(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate z-values. 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Next, we estimate the marginal effects of the determinants at the mean point (<Table 5-
2>). The marginal effect of an additional point in the government’s support for R&D is to 
increase the firms’ probability of cooperating with university by 19.0% and with GRI by 
23.0%, respectively. An additional point in the effectiveness of the IPR regime significantly 
increases the firms’ propensity for cooperation with the former by 10.0%. Moreover, an 
additional point in the importance of cost-sharing objective increases the firms’ likelihood 
by 3.0%. Regarding cooperation with GRI, an additional point in the importance of risk-
sharing objective increases the firms’ likelihood by 3.0%. 
 




<Table 5-2> Marginal effects 
  Industry-university cooperation Industry-GRI cooperation 
SIZE   0.02(1.01)  0.02(1.19) 
RD_INT     0.19(1.13)  0.22(1.32) 
GROUP -0.06(-1.27)  -0.07(-1.49) 
COST 0.03(1.68)* 0.03(1.45) 
RISK 0.02(1.47) 0.03(1.85)* 
r_S 0.27(2.02)** 0.26(2.04)** 
R_CB 0.36(1.55) 0.25(1.03) 
R_CN  0.48(2.36)** 0.47(2.15)** 
R_JB   0.59(3.20)** 0.39(1.43) 
R_KB  0.38(1.78)*  0.31(1.39) 
R_KN  0.44(2.21)** 0.35(1.67)* 
G_SUP 0.19(4.42)***  0.23(5.47)*** 
IN_IPR  0.10(1.87)* 0.04(0.87) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate z-values. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Therefore, based on the above, the first hypothesis of this paper is partly supported: the 
government’s support measures for R&D matter to IUG cooperation, while the IPR regime 
matters only to industry-university cooperation; neither firm size nor R&D intensity is 
deterministic to IUG cooperation, while firm location is; firms tend to cooperate with 
university for the cost-sharing objective and with GRI for the risk-sharing objective; and 
finally, middle-leveled chaebols tend not to be involved in IUG cooperation, while top-
leveled chaebols may do. 
Two points should be noticed, here. One is that IUG cooperation matters for non-
chaebol firms that cannot but depend on ‘firm-level’ resources for technological 
development, facing limits in access to timely and diversified technology. The other is that, 
unlike the case of advanced countries, firm capacity – firm size or R&D intensity – is not 
deterministic to IUG cooperation in Korea. Rather, the government’s role matters for 
promoting it, reflecting the government-led NIS of Korea. 
 
 
2. The Impacts of IUG Cooperation on Firm Performance 
 
(1) Innovation Probability 
 
This part analyzes the impact of IUG cooperation on the innovation probability of firms, 
using the Probit model. The dependent variable measures whether a firm does technological 
innovation: the value of this variable is 1 if it does and 0 otherwise. IUG cooperation 
variable, IUG, is measured as 1 if a firm cooperates with university and GRI, respectively, 
and 0 otherwise. Discriminated from previous studies, this controls the endogeneity using 




the estimated IUG, IUG^, to compare both results (<Table 5-3>).  
IUG reveals a positive sign (Model 1 and 2), but the result is contradictory when 
endogeneity is controlled, using IUG^: the coefficient of the latter is not statistically 
significant (Model 3 and 4). Based on the result, we can say that the significance of IUG in 
the first analysis originates from the endogeneity and not from the real impact of this 
cooperation. This is discriminated from previous studies in advanced countries (Monjon 
and Waelbroeck, 2003): the latter reports the positive impact of IUG cooperation, without 
controlling the endogeneity of IUG cooperation measure. 
In regard to the other variables, the impact of RD_INT investment is obscure: its 
coefficient is insignificant or significantly negative at the 10% level of significance. This 
result seems to stem from the possibility that, due to too short period of this research - two 
years, the impact of firm’ investment in R&D may not have been fully revealed. On the 
contrary, demand-pull and cost-push are statistically significant, which means the 
importance of innovation motives for the innovation possibility of firms. EXPORT is also 
statistically positive, implying that open or export-oriented firms tend to do technological 
innovation. 
<Table 5-3> The impact of IUG cooperation on the innovation probability of Korean firms 









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
SIZE 0.03(0.28) 0.04(0.35) 0.04(0.40) 0.04(0.39) 
RD_INT -1.56(-2.37)** -1.61(-2.36)** -1.05(-1.63) -1.03(-1.76)* 
GROUP 0.00(0.02) 0.01 (0.03) -0.10(-0.36) -0.15(-0.52) 
COST 0.12(1.24) 0.11(1.21) 0.17(1.51) 0.11(1.30) 
RISK 0.08(0.83) 0.08(0.82) 0.10(1.20) 0.11(1.37) 
G_SUP 0.21(1.05) 0.19(0.95) 0.61(2.19)** 0.62(2.08)** 
Demand-Pull 0.42(4.85)*** 0.42(4.83)*** 0.42(5.02)*** 0.42(5.05)*** 
Cost-Push 0.17(2.11)** 0.17(2.13)** 0.25(2.88)** 0.22(2.65)** 
AGE -0.01(-0.11) -0.01(-0.17) 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.05) 
EXPORT 0.23(1.18) 0.21(1.07) 0.41(1.87)* 0.43(1.86)* 
FOREIGN 0.55(1.10) 0.51(1.03) 0.19(0.46) 0.39(0.97) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
IUG 0.51(2.19)** 0.58(2.24)**   
IUG^   -1.69(-1.65) -1.40(-1.40) 
     
No. of obs 538 538 538 538 
Pseudo R^2 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 
Log likelihood -140.63 -140.43 -135.02 -135.33 
Pro(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate z-values 
            ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively.  





Therefore, based on the above, the second hypothesis of this paper is supported: IUG 
cooperation in Korea does not increase the innovation probability of firms. 
Although IUG cooperation does not affect the innovation probability of firms itself, it is 
possible that innovative firms would cooperate with university or GRI more to generate 
innovation outcomes. Thus, in the next part, we consider only innovative firms to analyze 
the impact of this cooperation. Because technologically unprogressive firms are to be 
dropped, we do not control the endogeneity of IUG cooperation measure any more.  
 
(2) Sale vs. Patent / Product Innovation vs. Process Innovation 
 
This part analyzes the impact of IUG cooperation on firm performance. It deals with 
only innovative firms, namely, the sub-samples that generate innovation outcomes. 
Accordingly, this checks the data for sample selection bias, based on whether a firm does 
technological innovation or not. As seen from the following results, IMILLS, the inverse 
Miller’s ratio, is statistically significant in some cases, proving the existence of sample 
selection bias. The bias is corrected then by this term, IMILLS. For dependent variables, 
three are measured here: the number of patents filed from each type of innovation, the 
percentage in sales of innovation outcomes from product innovation and labor productivity. 
<Table 5-4> and <Table 5-6> present the results for the impact of IUG cooperation 
according to the type of performance. The coefficient of IUG is not statistically significant 
for patent, sale or labor productivity, which implies that this cooperation has no significant 
impact on firm performance overall. However, when examined according to the type of 
innovation (<Table 5-5> and <Table 5-7>), this proves to positively affect the number of 
patents filed from new product innovation.24 It means that for innovative firms, IUG 
cooperation leads to more patents filed from this type of innovation. The result is different 
from the case of advanced countries where industry-university cooperation contributes to 
the sales of innovation outcomes as well as the number of patents filed. 
To the contrary, SIZE is significantly positive for patents, suggesting that larger firms 
file more patents than smaller ones. RD_INT is significant for patents filed from new 
product and process innovation, although it has no significance in patents overall. This 
variable is also significant for the sale of innovation outcomes.   These facts suggest that for 
innovative firms, firm size and in-house R&D matter for technological innovation, even to 
new product innovation, rather than IUG cooperation. Moreover, older firms prove to 
perform worse than younger ones, in terms of both patents and sales (AGE). 
Therefore, based on the above, the third and fourth hypotheses of this thesis are partly 
supported: for Korean innovative firms, the impact of IUG cooperation is revealed as 
patents rather than sales; moreover, this is significant for new product innovation, as a part 
of product innovation, rather than process innovation. 
                                            
24 In the case of industry-GRI cooperation, this variable is significant only when OECD dummies are 
controlled, suggesting that this cooperation contribute to the patent-filings but its significance is weak. 




<Table 5-4> The impact of industry-university cooperation on firm performance (OLS with sample selection) 
    Model 1     Model 2   
  Patent  Sale  Labor productivity Patent  Sale  
Labor 
productivity 
SIZE 0.10(4.88)*** 0.01(0.44) 0.00(0.58) 0.11(6.76)*** 0.01(0.48) 0.00(0.13) 
RD_INT 0.25(0.85) 0.35(1.06) -0.09(-2.07)** 0.22(1.00) 0.57(2.24)** -0.09(-2.00)* 
GROUP -0.05(-0.84) -0.12(-1.75)* 0.03(3.28)*** -0.05(-1.13) -0.08(-1.51) 0.03(3.13)*** 
Demand-Pull 0.08(1.50) 0.10(1.50) 0.00(0.08) 0.06(1.55) 0.02(0.84) -0.00(-0.24) 
Cost-Push 0.00(0.18) 0.08(3.39)*** -0.00(-0.49) -0.00(-0.12) 0.07(3.87)*** -0.00(-0.51) 
AGE -0.06(-2.29)** -0.06(-2.14)** 0.00(0.83) -0.06(-2.80)** -0.04(-1.77)* 0.00(0.29) 
OPENNESS 0.05(1.02) 0.03(0.53) 0.00(0.45) 0.04(1.09) -0.01(-0.23) 0.00(0.67) 
FOREIGN -0.05(-0.43) -0.08(-0.67) 0.04(2.46)** -0.04(-0.44) -0.02(-0.23) 0.03(1.96)* 
IUG(UNIV) 0.05(0.90) 0.07(1.10) -0.00(-0.36) 0.04(0.99) 0.01(0.16) -0.01(-1.11) 
OECD 
dummies Included Included Included       
Industry 
dummies       Included Included Included 
IMILLS 0.40(1.85)* 0.40(1.70)*   0.29(1.99)**     
       
No. of obs 382 330 310 382 330 310 
R^2 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.28 
Adjusted R^2 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.24 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
          ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
<Table 5-5> The impact of industry-university cooperation on the number of patents filed 
    Model 1     Model 2   











SIZE 0.05(6.06)*** 0.06(7.15)*** 0.02(2.50)** 0.05(5.76)*** 0.07(7.27)*** 0.02(2.51)** 
RD_INT 0.28(1.83)* 0.15(1.09) 0.38(2.39)** 0.31(1.91)* 0.12(0.90) 0.36(2.23)** 
GROUP -0.04(-1.78)* -0.04(-1.56) -0.00(-0.00) -0.04(-1.59) -0.04(-1.69)* 0.00(0.04) 
Demand-Pull 0.01(0.53) -0.01(-0.49) -0.01(-0.86) 0.01(0.76) -0.01(-0.62) -0.01(-0.86) 
Cost-Push -0.00(-0.28) -0.01(-0.62) -0.02(-2.25)** -0.00(-0.27) -0.01(-0.58) -0.02(-2.28)** 
AGE -0.02(-1.79)* -0.05(-4.11)*** -0.00(-0.14) -0.02(-1.85)* -0.05(-4.10)*** -0.00(-0.03) 
OPENNESS -0.00(-0.23) 0.02(0.82) 0.02(0.67) -0.00(-0.18) 0.01(0.59) 0.01(0.56) 
FOREIGN -0.00(-0.12) -0.05(-1.03) -0.04(-1.12) -0.01(-0.17) -0.05(-0.99) -0.04(-1.05) 
IUG(UNIV) 0.03(2.03)** -0.02(-1.06) -0.02(-0.93) 0.03(1.91)* -0.02(-1.13) -0.01(-0.87) 
OECD 
dummies Included Included Included       
Industry 
dummies       Included Included Included 
       
No. of obs 266 322 246 266 322 246 




R^2 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.09 
Adjusted R^2 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.02 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.23  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
<Table 5-6> The impact of industry-GRI cooperation on firm performance (OLS with sample selection) 
    Model 1     Model 2   
  Patent  Sale  Labor productivity Patent  Sale  
Labor 
productivity 
SIZE 0.10(7.44)*** 0.01(0.46) 0.00(0.67) 0.11(7.48)*** 0.01(0.47) 0.00(0.18) 
RD_INT 0.40(1.92)* 0.40(1.42) -0.08(-1.90)* 0.36(1.72)* 0.56(2.18)** -0.07(-1.76)* 
GROUP -0.05(-1.36) -0.11(-1.93)* 0.03(3.22)*** -0.05(-1.35) -0.08(-1.49) 0.03(3.05)*** 
Demand-Pull 0.00(0.04) 0.08(1.54) 0.00(0.08) -0.00(-0.01) 0.02(0.84) -0.00(-0.21) 
Cost-Push -0.02(-1.39) 0.08(3.91)*** -0.00(-0.39) -0.02(-1.32) 0.07(3.86)*** -0.00(-0.38) 
AGE -0.06(-3.27)** -0.06(-2.45)** 0.00(0.84) -0.06(-3.13)*** -0.04(-1.78)* 0.00(0.31) 
OPENNESS 0.02(0.49) 0.02(0.48) 0.00(0.64) 0.01(0.34) -0.01(-0.26) 0.01(0.95) 
FOREIGN -0.07(-1.01) -0.08(-0.82) 0.04(2.46)** -0.07(-0.95) -0.02(-0.24) 0.03(1.98)* 
IUG(GRI) 0.04(1.34) 0.07(1.15) -0.01(-1.50) 0.04(1.52) 0.01(0.37) -0.02(-2.50)** 
OECD 
dummies Included Included Included       
Industry 
dummies       Included Included Included 
IMILLS   0.33(1.72)*         
       
No. of obs 382 330 310 382 330 310 
R^2 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.25 
Adjusted R^2 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.2 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
<Table 5-7> The impact of industry-GRI cooperation on the number of patents filed 
    Model 1     Model 2   











SIZE 0.05(5.98)*** 0.06(7.07)*** 0.02(2.42)** 0.05(5.71)*** 0.06(7.19)*** 0.02(2.49)** 
RD_INT 0.28(1.76)* 0.13(0.96) 0.34(2.13)** 0.30(1.85)* 0.10(0.73) 0.31(1.89)* 
GROUP -0.04(-1.73)* -0.04(-1.54) 0.00(0.09) -0.04(-1.58) -0.04(-1.65) 0.00(0.13) 
Demand-Pull 0.00(0.42) -0.01(-0.41) -0.01(-0.87) 0.01(0.64) -0.01(-0.52) -0.01(-0.89) 
Cost-Push -0.00(-0.15) -0.01(-0.74) -0.02(-2.38)** -0.00(-0.13) -0.01(-0.72) -0.02(-2.37)** 
AGE -0.02(-1.77)* -0.05(-4.13)*** -0.00(-0.20) -0.02(-1.85)* 
-0.05(-
4.10)*** -0.00(-0.05) 
OPENNESS -0.01(-0.26) 0.01(0.68) 0.01(0.52) -0.00(-0.18) 0.01(0.40) 0.01(0.33) 
FOREIGN -0.01(-0.27) -0.04(-0.93) -0.04(-1.04) -0.01(-0.30) -0.04(-0.86) -0.04(-0.92) 
IUG(GRI) 0.02(1.68)* 0.00(0.27) 0.01(0.85) 0.02(1.45) 0.01(0.45) 0.02(1.11) 
OECD Included Included Included       






dummies       Included Included Included 
       
No. of obs 266 322 246 266 322 246 
R^2 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.1 
Adjusted R^2 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.02 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.21  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
From the above results, two things should be noticed. One is that the impact of IUG 
cooperation is revealed as patents rather than as sales, which can be explained in terms of 
the level of development in knowledge commercialization system. The logic is this!: it 
takes a relatively shorter time the knowledge from IUG cooperation to be filed as patents 
rather than to be sold, because the former is possible only with new ideas or through simple 
processes; the latter, however, heavily depends on the level of development in knowledge 
commercialization systems of a nation. In other word, unlike the case of advanced countries, 
the governance form of knowledge commercialization in Korea is still limited to education 
and joint or contract research, thereby making it difficult this knowledge to be quickly 
commercialized to sales. That is why, in Korea, the result of IUG cooperation is revealed as 
patent, the prior stage of knowledge commercialization. However, a limitation should be 
taken into account here: patents in this period can probably facilitate the increase of sale or 
productivity in the next period, but this paper could not capture this time-lag effect due to 
data limitation, that is, cross-sectional data. 
The other is that IUG cooperation is directly linked to the performance of new product 
rather than product-improving or process innovation. This can be interpreted such that the 
knowledge from this cooperation in Korea is not just technical or short-term based as the 
literature mentions (SERI, 2006; Park et al., 2000). University and GRI may have contributed 
to process innovation in the past, because their research focused on reverse engineering or 
problem-solving. However, their research capacity has been improved at present, which is 
useful or appropriate for new product innovation. However, it also should be considered as 
a limitation that the impact of IUG cooperation may not be fully revealed as patents filed 
from process innovation. Process innovation tends to be less readily protected via patents or 
trademarks; rather, it is exploited internally (Rouvinen, 2002). Moreover, process innovation 




The NIS of Korea is government-led, which has allowed chaebol firms to lead 
technological innovation since the 1970s. This chaebol-led innovation resulted in the “dual 
system” comprised of strong large and weak small firms and the weak status of university 
in national R&D. These unique characteristics of the Korea NIS have left its IUG linkages 




knowledge commercialization systems discriminated from those of advanced countries. 
Unlike the said countries, it is only recently that Korea has been realized the significance of 
knowledge commercialization to set up institutions for it.  
In this situation, this paper empirically analyzed 538 firms, in terms of the determinants 
of industry-university or GRI cooperation and its impact on firm performance. Regarding 
the latter, it focused on innovation probability and on sale vs. patent (by the type of 
performance) and product innovation vs. process innovation (by the type of innovation). 
The empirical results of this paper reflect these phenomena well. 
First, IUG cooperation in Korea is determined by firm characteristics, sector 
characteristics, and government’s support measures for R&D. The National R&D Programs 
are deterministic to the firm’s decision in IUG cooperation while firm size or R&D 
intensity is not, which reflects the characteristics of IUG linkage, broadly speaking the NIS 
of Korea as being government-led. Also, this cooperation is important for non-chaebol 
firms, specifically, those below the top-30. The IPR regime finds to matter only to industry-
university cooperation. 
Second, IUG cooperation has no significant impact on the innovation probability of 
firms. A large part of the knowledge from university is intangible with its imprecise impact, 
thus not directly affecting the firms’ success in technological innovation; rather, it may have 
an influence on the selection or direction of firms’ research projects. This analysis is 
discriminated from that of previous ones that have been undertaken without controlling the 
endogeneity of cooperation measure. 
Third, for Korean innovative firms, the impact of IUG cooperation is revealed in patent 
rather than other types of performance. The result is different from the case of advanced 
countries in which knowledge commercialization has been well developed, and industry-
university cooperation positively affects sales as well as patents. In Korea, due to the weak 
systems of knowledge commercialization, the impact is reveled only in patent, the prior 
stage of knowledge commercialization. In particular, this is significant for product 
innovation rather than product-improving or process innovation, implying the 
characteristics of the research of public research organizations as being useful or 
appropriate for the former neither just nor short-term based . 
This paper has two contributions. One is that this is the first empirical study on IUG 
linkages in Korea, which is discriminated from previous studies in the form of surveys or 
case studies. Particularly, it deals with GRI, in which previous study is totally lacking. The 
other contribution is that this thesis explains the difference in the role or impact of IUG 
cooperation between Korea and advanced countries, in terms of the level of development in 
knowledge commercialization systems. That it, due to the underdevelopment of 
commercialization systems, the knowledge from this cooperation is revealed in patent, 
without being able to shift commercially, in Korea. This paper points out this as a weakness 
in the NIS of Korea.  
In this respect, this paper suggests two points. One is that the IUG linkages in Korea 
should go beyond patent to reach commercialization. In the NIS, efficient knowledge flow 




is essential among institutional actors, but the commercialization, but not creation, of 
knowledge does not work well in Korea. So, new knowledge is shared or utilized by limited 
firms, eventually not contributing to the competitiveness of a nation as a whole. Therefore, 
we cannot overstate a need for establishing the NIS in which public research organizations 
play a central role in knowledge flows. The other is that the government’s policy should be 
streamlined for knowledge commercialization. The government’s support measures, e.g., 
some projects of National R&D Programs, evaluate firms based only on patent filed or 
registered rather than commercialization performance. Accordingly, incentives are too 
small for firms to endeavor to commercialize their technology. Moreover, they focus on the 
number, rather than quality, of the patents, leading them in a hurry to produce a low-level of 
patents that finally cannot be commercialized. Therefore, the Korean government needs to 
diversify the ways of evaluation and management of knowledge generated from the 
linkages as well as to focus on the formation of it. 
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